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Abstract
A principal hires an agent to provide a verifiable service. Initially, the agent can
exert unobservable effort to reduce his disutility from providing the service. If
the agent is free to waive his right to quit, he may voluntarily sign a contract
specifying an inefficiently large service level, while there are insufficient incentives
to exert effort. If the agent’s right to quit is inalienable, the underprovision of
effort may be further aggravated, but the service level is ex post efficient. Overall,
it turns out that the total surplus can be larger when agents are not permitted to
contractually waive their right to quit work. Yet, we also study an extension of
our model in which even the agent can be strictly better off when the parties have
the contractual freedom to waive the agent’s right to quit.
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1 Introduction
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits involun-
tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. But what if an agent voluntarily
signs a contract to provide a service for a principal? Should such contracts always
be enforceable? Or should the freedom of contract be restricted, such that the
agent cannot waive his or her right to quit work?
According to the Coase Theorem, restricting the freedom of two rational par-
ties to contract with each other cannot be welfare-enhancing when there are no
externalities on third parties.1 After all, when two parties voluntarily agree to a
contract, then both parties must be (at least weakly) better off than in the absence
of the contract. When the freedom of contract is not restricted, the Coase Theorem
asserts that the two parties will agree on a contract maximizing the total surplus
that can be generated in their relationship. Thus, prohibiting certain contracts
(e.g., labor contracts in which the agent waives the right to quit work) cannot be
desirable from an economic efficiency point of view.
However, the Coase Theorem holds only if there are no transaction costs. Con-
tract theory has identified moral hazard problems due to unobservable actions as
an important source of transaction costs.2 In this paper, we argue that in the
presence of moral hazard problems there are circumstances under which it may be
welfare-enhancing not to enforce contracts in which the agent’s quitting rights are
waived. Specifically, in our setup the total surplus generated in a relationship be-
tween two parties may be strictly larger when the freedom of contract is restricted
such that agents have an inalienable right to quit work.
In our baseline model it is always the case that the principal weakly prefers
contractual freedom, while the agent weakly prefers having an inalienable right
to quit. Yet, in an extension of our model we show that there are circumstances
under which also the agent may be strictly better off when the parties have the
contractual freedom to waive the agent’s right to quit.
1See the recent review article by Medema (2020) for an extensive discussion of the work initi-
ated by Coase’s (1960) seminal contribution. For a concise introduction to the Coase Theorem,
cf. Singh (2016).
2On the origins of contract theory and the analysis of moral hazard problems, see Hart
and Holmström (1987). For modern textbook expositions of contract theory, see Laffont and
Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). Cf. also the recent survey articles by
Hart (2017) and Holmström (2017).
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Background. Pope (2010) has pointed out that an inalienable right to quit
work did not arise straightforwardly from the Thirteenth Amendment.3 On the
one hand, one can argue that if a worker voluntarily enters into a contract, it
is hard to see how the worker could be in a condition of involuntary servitude.
If workers were granted the right to quit at any time, then they would lose the
freedom to make fully enforceable labor contracts. On the other hand, one can
argue that servitude becomes involuntary the moment that a worker wishes to
cease work and is prevented from doing so.4 According to Pope (2010, p. 1491),
today the right to quit is “the only major, unenumerated constitutional right to
win near-universal approval”.
But why do we have to protect workers against their own free choice? Pope
(2010, p. 1492) argues that a worker’s choice might not be truly free, workers
might not know their rights, and they “might need paternalistic protection”. Our
contribution in the present paper is to develop a contract-theoretic model in order
to supplement these reasons with a purely efficiency-based rationale. However, we
also point out that it can actually be in a rational agent’s self-interest to have the
contractual freedom to waive the right to quit.
Outline of the model. We consider a principal (she) who hires an agent (he)
to provide a service in the future (i.e., at stage 2). The service level is verifiable,
so in principle it is possible to enforce a contractually agreed-upon service level.
However, at stage 1 the agent can exert effort in order to reduce his disutility
from performing the second-stage task. The ex ante uncertain outcome of the first
stage is either a success (i.e., the disutility will be small) or a failure (i.e., the
disutility will be large). It is verifiable whether there is a success or a failure, so it
is possible to write a contract that specifies a second-stage service level depending
on the first-stage outcome.5 However, the effort level is unobservable; i.e., there
3The Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865. On the legislative origins of the right to
quit work as set forth in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867,
see also the discussions in VanderVelde (1989), Wonnell (1993), Oman (2009), Zietlow (2010),
Soifer (2012), and Brandwein (2017).
4Initially, in Robertson v. Baldwin (165 U.S. 275 [1897]) the Supreme Court resolved the
tension between the freedom of contract and the right to quit in favor of the former (the “Illinois
rule”). Yet, the Court reversed direction (thereby adopting the “Indiana rule”) in Clyatt v. United
States (197 U.S. 207, 215 [1905]) and reaffirmed this position in Bailey v. Alabama (219 U.S. 219
[1911]) and in Pollock v. Williams (322 U.S. 4, 25 [1944]).
5We will show in Section 5 that the insights gained in our model carry over to the case in
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is a moral hazard problem. We assume throughout that while both parties are
risk-neutral, the agent has no wealth. Hence, we consider an “efficiency wage”
model in which payments from the principal to the agent must not be negative.6
For example, in the first stage the agent might engage in R&D activities with
an uncertain outcome, whereas in the second stage the agent performs a routine
production task which is fully contractible. As an illustration, suppose the agent
is in charge of developing a new vaccine. While the agent’s effort in the research
stage is a hidden action, it is possible to verify the outcome (say, whether or not the
vaccine requires deep-freezer units, which would make handling the vaccine much
more costly). Note that already at the outset of the principal-agent relationship
the principal can specify a verifiable number of doses of the vaccine that the agent
will have to produce after the vaccine has been developed.7
We consider two scenarios. In Scenario I, the freedom of contract is unre-
stricted, so the parties can agree on a contract in which the agent’s quitting rights
are waived. The principal offers a contract to the agent which specifies payments
and second-stage service levels depending on the outcome of the first stage. Given
such a contract, the agent might want to quit at the beginning of the second stage,
even though at the beginning of the first stage the agent voluntarily agreed to the
contract waiving his right to quit.8 Indeed, it turns out that under some circum-
stances the contract will specify an ex post inefficiently large service level. The
reason is that in order to incentivize the agent to exert high effort in the first stage,
the principal can reward the agent with a large payment in case of a success, but
she cannot use a negative payment to punish the agent in case of a failure. Instead,
the parties agree on a contract according to which utility is transferred from the
which the agent has private information about the first-stage outcome.
6The term “efficiency wage” is used here in the contract-theoretic sense of Tirole (1999,
p. 745), Laffont and Martimort (2002, p. 174), and Schmitz (2005c).
7One can think of numerous other real-world situations that fit in with our formal framework.
For instance, in the first stage a worker may invest relationship-specific effort in his human
capital. It is unobservable how hard the worker learns, but at the end of the first stage the
worker’s qualification can be certified. The worker’s verifiable second-stage responsibilities can
be contractually specified depending on his qualification. Cf. the recent work by Fudenberg and
Rayo (2019) for a model in which a cash-constrained apprentice is free to walk away at any time.
8Note that in Scenario I it is assumed that an agent can enter into a labor contract that is
enforceable by specific performance. See Shavell (2006, p. 855), who emphasizes the desirability
of specific performance when an agent is judgment-proof in the sense that the agent’s assets are
limited such that he cannot pay damages.
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agent to the principal by an ex post inefficiently large service level in the case of
a first-stage failure. Moreover, due to the deadweight loss caused by the upward
distortion of the service level, the principal will not always induce high effort when
she would do so in a first-best world without frictions.
In Scenario II, the freedom of contract is restricted, such that labor contracts
in which the agent waives his right to quit are prohibited by law. Hence, the
agent must voluntarily agree to the contractual terms at the beginning of the first
stage and at the beginning of the second stage.9 This means that in the second
stage the principal must always reimburse the agent for his disutility of providing
the specified service level, so the parties will always agree on the ex post efficient
service level. Since the agent cannot be punished for a first-stage failure with an
ex post inefficient service level, the principal must now leave a rent to the agent
in order to motivate him to exert high effort in the first stage. Thus, inducing
high effort in Scenario II is more expensive for the principal than in Scenario I. As
a consequence, in Scenario II the principal will inefficiently refrain from inducing
high effort for an even larger range of parameters than in Scenario I.
To summarize, our model highlights the following trade-off. If the freedom of
contract is unrestricted (Scenario I), then compared to the first-best benchmark
there may be an upward distortion of the second-stage service level and a down-
ward distortion of the first-stage effort level. If the right to quit work cannot be
waived (Scenario II), the problem of the downward distortion of the effort level
is aggravated, but the service level is ex post efficient. Overall, as might have
been expected, there are circumstances under which the total surplus is larger in
Scenario I than in Scenario II. Yet, there are also circumstances under which re-
stricting the freedom of contract by an inalienable right to quit can yield a larger
total surplus. In particular, not permitting the agent to waive his right to quit
can be welfare-enhancing when the optimal second-stage service level depends on
the outcome of the first stage and when it is important to motivate the agent to
exert high first-stage effort. Given that legal rules must be general and cannot
rely on evaluating welfare on a case-by-case basis, our model thus suggests that
the lawmaker may conclude that (compared to a situation in which the freedom
of contract is not restricted) an inalienable right to quit work indeed fares better
9Thus, in Scenario II the courts do not enforce specific performance contracts. Indeed, current
law does not grant specific performance in the case of a personal-services contract. Cf. the famous
English case of Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
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on average.
However, it should be emphasized that in our baseline model it is assumed that
the principal’s technology that is used by the agent to perform his tasks is already
in place. When the principal must first make a non-contractible investment to
install the technology, then in Scenario II the principal’s expected profit may be
too small to make the investment worthwhile. In this case, a strictly positive total
surplus can be generated only in Scenario I. Hence, when the agent is able to get
a share of the total surplus generated by the two parties, then also the agent may
strictly prefer Scenario I. We should thus be aware of the fact that restricting the
freedom of contract by making the right to quit inalienable can actually hurt both
the principal and the agent.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we briefly discuss the relation of our model to the contract-
theoretic literature. In Section 3, the model is presented. We analyze the model
and derive our main results in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that our results
are robust when only the agent learns the first-stage outcome. In Section 6, we
point out that in an extension of our model even the agent can be strictly better
off when the right to quit may be waived. Concluding remarks follow in Section
7. Some formal proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related literature
It is well-known that restricting the freedom of contract can be desirable if a
contract between two parties may have negative external effects on a third party
(see e.g. Spier and Whinston, 1995). In contrast, we focus on the gains from trade
that are generated within the relationship of a principal and an agent; i.e., our
results do not depend on externalities on third parties.
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that in our model the parties are always
symmetrically informed at the time of contracting. Our setup is thus different from
papers such as Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Schmitz (2004), who show that
legal restrictions on private contracts can be welfare-enhancing when the contract
is written by asymmetrically informed parties.10
10Aghion and Hermalin (1990) argue that it can be desirable to restrict the class of contracts
that a privately informed party is allowed to offer, because in this way inefficient signalling can
be ruled out. In a screening model, Schmitz (2004) shows that employment protection laws can
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The driving force in our “efficiency wage” model is a moral hazard problem
with bounded payments.11 To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the
first contribution to the moral hazard literature highlighting a trade-off between
insufficient incentives to exert unobservable effort in the first stage and the spec-
ification of an inefficiently large service level in the second stage. While several
papers in the literature on moral hazard problems with bounded payments have
studied two-stage models, these models are typically focused on the implications
of second-stage rents for first-stage incentives (see e.g. Schmitz, 2005a, Kräkel
and Schöttner, 2016, or Pi, 2018). In these papers the decision to be taken in
the second stage is a hidden action, so it is impossible to contractually specify a
second-stage service level that the agent would not provide voluntarily. In con-
trast, in our model the service level is verifiable, allowing us to study how under
unrestricted freedom of contract overwork in the second stage may be used to ex
post inefficiently extract the rent that the agent would get if he had an unalienable
right to quit.
Our model is also related to the literature on non-compete clauses, which are
meant to protect employers from employees taking away technological know-how
or key customers to competitors of the employer.12 In contrast, in our model we
focus on the principal-agent relationship and do not consider competitors of the
principal.13 Our Scenario II is also related to Englmaier et al. (2014), who consider
enhance welfare when an employer makes a contract offer to a privately informed employee.
11Moral hazard models with risk-neutral but wealth-constrained agents have become in-
cresingly popular in the contract-theoretic literature. For early papers in this vein, see e.g. Innes
(1990), Baliga and Sjöström (1998), and Pitchford (1998). More recent contributions include
e.g. Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012), Kragl and Schöttner (2014), Pi (2014, 2018), Tamada and
Tsai (2014), Axelson and Bond (2015), Green and Taylor (2016), Kräkel (2016), Kräkel and
Schöttner (2016), Cato and Ishihara (2017), Schöttner (2017), Altan (2019), At et al. (2019), Au
and Chen (2019), and Hoppe and Schmitz (2021).
12Non-compete agreements also play an important role in the sports and entertainment in-
dustries. In the classic English opera dispute Lumley v. Wagner (42 Eng. Rep. 687 [1852]),
German soprano Johanna Wagner signed a contract to perform at the opera house owned by
plaintiff Benjamin Lumley. Wagner wanted to perform at a rival theatre. The court found that
while an affirmative injunction was not appropriate (i.e., specific performance of personal service
arrangements cannot be enforced), a negative injunction could be issued. The Lumely rule has
become the progenitor of many cases in sports law (see Rapp, 2005).
13For an analysis of non-compete arrangements from an economic perspective, see Kräkel and
Sliwka (2009).
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a moral-hazard model in which a “knowledge worker” is free to leave after he has
exerted effort in a first stage. Yet, if the worker stays, there is no second-stage
decision to be taken. Hence, in contrast to the model that we study, there can
never be ex post inefficient overproduction in their framework.
Finally, it should be noted that while renegotiation in contractual relationships
plays a central role in incomplete contracting models (cf. Hart, 1995), renegotiation
has no bite in our model. In particular, the ex post inefficiency that occurs in
Scenario I cannot be renegotiated away. When an ex post inefficiently large second-
stage service level has been specified, then at the beginning of the second stage the
agent would prefer to renegotiate. Yet, since the agent has no wealth he cannot
compensate the principal, who will therefore insist on the contract being fulfilled.14
3 The basic model
A principal hires an agent to conduct a project on her behalf. Both parties are
risk-neutral. The agent has no wealth, so payments to the agent must not be nega-
tive (i.e., we study a framework with limited liability). The project consists of two
stages. First, there is a preparation stage. Second, there is a project implementa-
tion stage. In the preparation stage, the agent can exert unobservable preparatory
effort to reduce the expected difficulty of project implementation, which is mea-
sured by the ex ante uncertain disutility (e.g., the physical or psychological stress)
associated with managing a project of a given size. The contractible size of the
project which is to be implemented by the agent can be conditional on the realized
difficulty of project implementation, which is verifiable in our baseline model. For
simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting. In the remainder of this section,
we describe the principal-agent relationship in more detail.
3.1 Project preparation and project implementation
If a project of size y ∈ [0, 1] is implemented in the second stage, the project’s
benefit by accrues to the principal, while the cost of project implementation in
form of the non-monetary disutility cy is borne by the agent. From an ex ante
14In contrast, discussing whether or not contractual non-renegotiation clauses should be en-
forceable, Schmitz (2005b) considers a two-stage moral hazard problem in which there is scope for
mutually beneficial renegotiation at the beginning of the second stage. On the law and economics
of contract modifications, see also Davis (2006).
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point of view, the implementation cost parameter c can be either low or high; i.e.,
c ∈ {cL, cH}, where 0 < cL < cH and b > cL. The actual realization of the cost c of
project implementation is determined by a random draw of nature after the agent
has decided how much effort to devote to the preparation of the project in the
first stage. Specifically, if the agent decides to exert preparatory effort e ∈ {0, 1}
at non-monetary cost K(e) = ke, where k > 0, then Prob{c = cL|e} = pe. We
assume that 0 < p0 < p1 < 1; i.e., the probability of a low disutility is larger when
the agent exerts effort e = 1 than when he exerts effort e = 0.
3.2 Information and contracts
The ex post realization of the cost of project implementation, measured by c, is
verifiable.15 The agent’s choice of preparatory effort, on the other hand, is a hidden
action and thus non-verifiable. Hence, a contract can specify a transfer payment
from the principal to the agent and a level of project size that is conditioned on
the realization of the cost of project implementation.
Specifically, at some initial contracting stage the principal offers the agent a
contract Γ = (tL, tH , yL, yH), which bindingly specifies transfer payment ti and
project size yi for the case that the implementation of the project turns out to be
associated with cost ci, where i ∈ {L,H}. Note that ti is paid from the principal
to the agent and must be non-negative due to limited liability.
We consider two different contracting scenarios. In Scenario I, the freedom
of contract is not restricted. Hence, the principal can offer a contract to the
agent under which the agent waives his right to quit work; i.e., the agent can
contractually bind himself to the principal for both stages of the project. In
Scenario II, the agent cannot waive his right to quit work. Here, signing the
initial contract binds the agent to the principal only for the preparation stage of
the project. The agent cannot commit not to unilaterally terminate the contractual
relationship with the principal after the completion of the preparation stage and
before the start of the implementation stage.
3.3 Sequence of events
The sequence of events is as follows. At date T = 0, the contracting stage, the
principal offers the contract Γ = (tL, tH , yL, yH) and the agent rejects or accepts.
15We will relax this assumption in Section 5.
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In case of rejection, the two parties go separate ways and each party receives
a reservation utility equal to zero.16 In case of acceptance, the preparation stage
begins. At date T = 1, the agent chooses preparatory effort e ∈ {0, 1}. Thereafter,
at date T = 2, the cost c ∈ {cL, cH} of project implementation is realized. The
realization of c is observed by both the principal and the agent, which concludes
the preparation stage. At the interim date T = 3, before the implementation
stage begins, in Scenario II the agent decides whether or not to quit work. In case
the agent quits work, the two parties go separate ways and each party receives
a reservation utility equal to zero. In case the agent does not quit work, the
relationship moves on to the implementation stage. In Scenario I, where the agent
waived his right to quit work when accepting the principal’s contract offer at date
T = 0, nothing happens at date T = 3 and the relationship moves on to the
implementation stage. At date T = 4, the agent implements the project of the
size that was contractually specified for the realized cost c, and the principal pays
the corresponding transfer to the agent.
4 Analysis
4.1 The first-best benchmark
In a first-best world without contracting frictions, the Coase Theorem holds and
thus the parties would agree on the decisions that maximize the expected total
surplus. Specifically, in our setup the expected gains from trade are
G(yL, yH , e) = pe(b− cL)yL + (1− pe)(b− cH)yH − ke,
which comprise the expected net benefit from project implementation minus the
effort cost for project preparation. The first-best levels of project size and prepara-





G(yL, yH , e).
Given realization c ∈ {cL, cH} of the implementation cost, ex post efficiency
requires maximum project size if the benefit from implementation exceeds the
16While it is beyond the scope of the present paper, in future research it might be interesting
to embed our model in a framework with competing principals where the agent’s reservation
utility is endogenously determined.
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associated cost; i.e., yFB(c) = 1 if c < b. If, in contrast, the cost of project
implementation exceeds the associated benefit, then ex post efficiency requires
the project to be cancelled; i.e., yFB(c) = 0 if b < c. Hence, in the case of low
implementation cost the first-best project size is yFB(cL) = 1, since cL < b holds
by assumption. In the case of high implementation cost, the first-best project size
yFB(cH) depends on whether b exceeds cH or not.
The ex ante efficient effort level maximizes the expected gains from trade
given the ex post efficient project size. A comparison of G(1, yFB(cH), 1) and
G(1, yFB(cH), 0) then leads to the following characterization of the first-best levels
of project size and effort.17
Proposition 1 The first-best levels of project size and effort are given by





1 if cH ≤ b,





1 if k ≤ kFB,
0 if kFB < k,
where
kFB := (p1 − p0)
[




The decision rule that governs first-best effort choice is very intuitive. If cH ≤ b,
then maximum project size is implemented irrespective of whether the implemen-
tation cost is low or high. Hence, high rather than low preparatory effort should
be exerted if the associated decrease in expected cost of implementing a project of
maximum size, (p1 − p0)(cH − cL), exceeds the associated increase in effort cost,
k. If, on the other hand, b < cH , then the project is canceled if the implementa-
tion cost turns out to be high. In this case, high rather than low effort should be
exerted if the associated increase in the expected net benefit from implementing
a project of maximum size at low cost, (p1 − p0)(b − cL), exceeds the associated
increase in effort cost, k.
4.2 Scenario I: Unrestricted freedom of contract
In Scenario I, the principal and the agent are free to write a contract accord-
ing to which the agent waives his right to quit work. The agent may thus bind
himself to the principal for both the preparation stage and the implementation
17For simplicity, we assume that y = 1 is chosen in case of indifference regarding the project
size, and e = 1 is chosen in case of indifference regarding the effort level.
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stage. Suppose that at date T = 0 the principal and the agent sign a contract
Γ = (tL, tH , yL, yH) under which the agent exerts effort e ∈ {0, 1}. The princi-
pal’s expected utility in this case consists of the expected benefit from project
implementation minus the expected transfer payment to the agent:
UP (Γ, e) = b[peyL + (1− pe)yH ]− [petL + (1− pe)tH ]
The agent’s expected utility consists of the expected transfer payment from the
principal minus the expected cost of project implementation minus the cost for
preparatory effort:
UA(Γ, e) = petL + (1− pe)tH − [pecLyL + (1− pe)cHyH ]− ke.





UA(Γ, e) ≥ UA(Γ, e
′) with e, e′ ∈ {0, 1}, e 6= e′, (ICe)
UA(Γ, e) ≥ 0, (PCe)
tL ≥ 0, tH ≥ 0. (LL)
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICe) reflects that the principal correctly
anticipates that at date T = 1 the agent will choose the effort level which max-
imizes his own expected utility under the contract offered by the principal. The
participation constraint (PCe) ensures that at date T = 0, the agent (who cor-
rectly anticipates his own date-1 effort choice) is willing to accept the contract
offered by the principal. Finally, the limited liability constraint (LL) requires the
transfer payments specified in the principal’s contract offer to be non-negative.
Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, recall that the sum of the princi-
pal’s and the agent’s expected utilities is equal to the expected gains from trade;
i.e., UP (Γ, e) + UA(Γ, e) = G(yL, yH , e). As a consequence, when making her con-
tract offer, the principal effectively aims at maximizing the expected gains from
trade minus the agent’s expected utility.
Second, according to the incentive compatibility constraint (ICe), the agent is
willing to devote high effort e = 1 to project preparation whenever
(p1 − p0)[(tL − tH)− (cLyL − cHyH)] ≥ k; (1)
18Throughout, we assume that the agent exerts the level of preparatory effort desired by the
principal in case that he is indifferent between exerting high effort and exerting low effort.
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i.e., whenever the associated change in the difference of the expected transfer
payment and the expected cost of project implementation exceeds the associated
increase in the effort cost for project preparation.
Case 1: cH ≤ b. If the benefit b from project implementation (at least weakly)
exceeds the high realization of the implementation cost, then the first-best project
size and the first-best effort will be attained when the freedom of contract is
not restricted. To see this, consider a contract that specifies the same transfer
payment for both realizations of the implementation cost; i.e., suppose that tL =
tH . In this case, the expected transfer payment does not depend on the agent’s
decision regarding preparatory effort and, as can be seen from (1), the agent’s effort
choice in the preparation stage is independent of the two transfer payments. If, in
addition, the contract specifies the ex post efficient levels of project size (i.e., if yL =
yH = 1), then according to (1) the agent is willing to exert high rather than low
preparatory effort if the associated “saving” on the expected cost of implementing
a project of maximum size, (p1 − p0)(cH − cL), exceeds the associated increase
in effort costs for preparatory effort, k. Hence, as revealed by comparison with
Proposition 1, the agent is always willing to exert the first-best effort level under
such a contract. Finally, note that the principal can fully extract the expected
gains from trade (i.e., the agent’s participation constraint becomes binding) by
setting the identical transfers tL and tH equal to the overall expected cost of project
preparation and project implementation (given first-best effort and first-best levels
of project size). As this is the best the principal can do, we have established the
following observation:19
Lemma 1 Consider Scenario I and suppose that cH ≤ b. Then the contract Γ
that specifies transfer payments tL = tH = ke
FB+peFBcL+(1−peFB)cH and levels
of project size yL = yH = 1 is an optimal contract.
Hence, the optimal contract specifies ex post efficient maximum project size
and provides the agent with ex ante efficient incentives. Therefore, in case the
19Note that the contract characterized in the following lemma is an optimal contract, but it is
not the unique optimal contract. In fact, given that the participation constraint is satisfied with
equality for given levels of project size, the principal does not care about the exact specification of
the transfers (as long as the incentive compatibility constraint and the limited liability constraint
hold as well). The same qualifier applies to the rest of our results whenever there are multiple
optimal contracts.
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principal’s benefit from project implementation (at least weakly) exceeds the high
realization of the agent’s implementation cost, contracting in Scenario I always
results in first-best project size and first-best effort.20
Proposition 2 Consider Scenario I and suppose that cH ≤ b. The levels of project
size and effort implemented under the optimal contract are given by
yIL = 1, y
I





1 if k ≤ kFB,
0 if kFB < k.
Case 2: b < cH. In order to determine the levels of effort and project size that
prevail in case that the benefit b from project implementation is strictly smaller
than the high realization of the implementation cost, we proceed in two steps.
First, for each effort level, we determine the contract that maximizes the principal’s
expected utility conditional on the agent exerting this effort level. Second, we
compare the principal’s expected utility under these contracts to determine which
effort level she will actually implement.
Step 1. First, suppose that the principal wants to induce low effort e = 0. In
this case, the optimal contract specifies the ex post efficient levels of project size
and the principal fully extracts the expected gains from trade. To see this, consider
a contract that specifies ex post efficient levels of project size, yL = 1 and yH = 0,
and transfer payments tL and tH that exactly reimburse the agent for his respective
cost of project implementation; i.e., tL = cL and tH = 0. As can be seen from (1),
with transfers exactly covering the cost of project implementation, the agent will
exert low preparatory effort because there is no benefit associated with exerting
high effort that would make it worthwhile for the agent to incur the associated
effort cost. Finally, note that the expected transfer payment corresponds to the
agent’s overall expected cost in case he exerts low effort, such that the agent’s par-
ticipation constraint is binding and the principal’s expected utility coincides with
the expected gains from trade under low preparatory effort and implementation
of the ex post efficient project size. As this is the best the principal can do given
that she implements low effort, we have established the following observation:
20We follow the usual convention that the principal implements high preparatory effort in
case that she is indifferent between implementing high effort and implementing low effort. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the principal implements maximum project size in case that she is
indifferent between implementing maximum size and implementing any other project size.
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Lemma 2 Consider Scenario I and suppose that b < cH . If the principal wants to
implement low effort (e = 0), then the contract Γ0 that specifies transfer payments
tL = cL and tH = 0 and levels of project size yL = 1 and yH = 0 is an optimal
contract.
Next, suppose that the principal wants to induce high effort e = 1. To deter-
mine the optimal contract in this case, we proceed as follows. First, we determine
the “cost-minimizing” transfers for exogenously fixed levels of project size. There-
after, we determine the optimal level of project size given that transfers are chosen
in a cost-minimizing fashion.
For given levels of project size (yL, yH) ∈ [0, 1]
2, the problem of finding the





p1tL + (1− p1)tH subject to (IC1), (PC1), (LL).
To get an intuition for the solution to this cost-minimization problem, consider
the effect of a small decrease in yH . A decrease in yH “tightens” the incentive
compatibility constraint (cf. (1)) because avoiding high implementation cost by
exerting high preparatory effort becomes less valuable for the agent. On the other
hand, a decrease in yH “relaxes” the participation constraint because the agent’s
expected cost of project implementation decreases. Thus, it stands to reason that
the principal’s choice of transfers is restricted by the incentive compatibility con-
straint (together with the limited liability constraint) rather than the participation
constraint if yH is low, whereas the participation constraint should impose a bind-
ing restriction if yH is high. Indeed, in the proof of Lemma 3 below we show that





such that the participation constraint does not impose a binding restriction if
yH < ỹ. In this case, the unique cost-minimizing pair of transfers satisfies the
incentive compatibility constraint with equality when the wage levels are set as
low as possible; i.e., tH is set equal to zero and tL is set such that (IC1) binds. If,
in contrast, yH ≥ ỹ, the participation constraint must be binding under the cost-
minimizing transfer combination. Specifically, any feasible transfer combination
that satisfies (PC1) with equality and additionally satisfies (IC1) and (LL) is a cost-
minimizing transfer combination. In consequence, the transfer combination with
tH being set equal to zero and tL being set such that the participation constraint
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is satisfied with equality is always a cost-minimizing transfer combination. The
cost-minimizing transfer combination for levels (yL, yH) ∈ [0, 1]
2 of project size
then (w.l.o.g.) can be summarized as follows:












cHyH if yH ≥ ỹ.
(2)
For future reference, note that the agent’s expected utility from signing a contract
that specifies the levels of project size yL and yH and the associated cost-minimizing
transfers t̄L and t̄H is given by
UA((yL, yH , t̄L, t̄H), 1) = cH max{0, ỹ − yH}. (3)
Given the cost-minimizing specification of the transfer payments in (2), the













+ cLyL − cHyH
]
if yH ≤ ỹ,









if yH ≥ ỹ.









> 0 if yH < ỹ,
< 0 if yH > ỹ,
the optimal levels of project size are given by yL = 1 and yH = min{1, ỹ}, which
inserted in (2) yields the following observation.
Lemma 3 Consider Scenario I and suppose that b < cH . If the principal wants to




+ cL − cH min{1, ỹ} and tH = 0 and levels of project size yL = 1 and
yH = min{1, ỹ} is an optimal contract.
Proof: See the Appendix.
In comparison to the first-best benchmark, implementation of high preparatory
effort comes along with excessive (i.e., with ex post inefficiently high) project size
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in case of high implementation cost. According to (3), if the capacity constraint
on project size imposes a binding restriction (i.e., if 1 < ỹ), then the participation
constraint is slack and the agent obtains a strictly positive rent. If, on the other
hand, the capacity constraint on project size does not have bite (i.e., if ỹ ≤ 1),
then the participation constraint binds and, despite high effort being induced, the
agent does not obtain a rent but receives only his reservation utility. Formally, the
agent’s expected utility under this contract amounts to
UA(Γ
I
1, 1) = cH(ỹ −min{1, ỹ}).
Step 2. According to Lemma 2, the principal’s maximum expected utility from
implementing low effort is
UP (Γ0, 0) = p0(b− cL). (4)
According to Lemma 3, the principal’s maximum expected utility from implement-
ing high effort is
UP (Γ
I




+ cL −min {1, ỹ} cH
]
. (5)
Comparison of (4) and (5) reveals the following levels of project size and effort to
be induced under the optimal contract.21
Proposition 3 Consider Scenario I and suppose that b < cH . The levels of project
size and effort implemented under the optimal contract are given by






ỹ if k ≤ kI ,





1 if k ≤ kI ,





cHp1(1− p0)− b(1− p1)p0
. (6)
Proof: See the Appendix.
As 0 < kI < kFB, comparison of Propositions 1 and 3 reveals that the first-
best allocation is failed whenever first-best effort is high, i.e., whenever k ≤ kFB.
21Note that when p0 goes to zero or when p1 goes to one, then k
I approaches kFB .
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Specifically, preparatory effort is inefficiently low if kI < k ≤ kFB, whereas project
size is inefficiently high if k ≤ kI .
Notably, whenever the principal induces high effort, the capacity constraint on
project size has no bite; i.e., k < kI implies that ỹ < 1. Hence, under the optimal
contract the participation constraint is always satisfied with equality such that the
agent never obtains a rent. To understand this result, suppose that the levels of
project size are fixed on the ex post efficient levels, yL = 1 and yH = 0. As yH =
0 < ỹ, from our discussion of Lemma 3, we know that the principal then has to leave
a strictly positive rent to the agent if she wants to induce high preparatory effort
for these levels of project size. An increase in yH above the ex post efficient level,
however, decreases the agent’s rent (dUA
dyH
= −cH , according to (3)) by more than it
decreases the expected gains from trade (dG(yL,yH ,1)
dyH
= −(1−p1)cH)), such that the
principal finds it beneficial to increase project size in case of high implementation
cost as far as possible (i.e., until the agent’s participation constraint binds). The
principal thus “abuses” the project size in case of high implementation cost to
extract any rent that she otherwise would have to leave to the agent.
4.3 Scenario II: The inalienable right to quit
In Scenario II, the freedom of contract is restricted, such that the agent’s right to
quit work cannot be waived by the contract. Thus, the agent cannot commit not
to unilaterally terminate the contractual relationship with the principal at date
T = 3, i.e., after both parties learned the actual cost of project implementation.
If cH ≤ b, then welfare (measured by the expected gains from trade) in Scenario
II cannot be strictly larger than in Scenario I, because Scenario I already results
in first-best project size and first-best preparatory effort (cf. Proposition 2). For
the remainder of this section, we thus focus on the case where b < cH .
For the agent to be willing to continue the contractual relationship at date
T = 3, the following two interim participation constraints have to be satisfied:




V (tH , yH |cH) ≥ 0, (PC
II
H )
where V (t, y|c) := t − cy denotes the agent’s utility from receiving transfer t for
implementing a project of size y at implementation cost c. The principal’s contract
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design problem thus takes the following form:
max
Γ∈R2×[0,1]2





Compared to Scenario I, the principal faces two additional constraints, the interim
participation constraints (PCIIL ) and (PC
II
H ). In consequence, the best that the
principal can hope for in Scenario II is to be as well off as in Scenario I.
To determine the optimal contract, we again follow a two-step procedure: First,
for each effort level, we determine the contract that maximizes the principal’s
expected utility conditional on the agent exerting this effort level. Second, we
compare the principal’s expected utility under these contracts to determine which
effort level she will implement.
Step 1. First, suppose that the principal wants to induce low effort e = 0.
Recall that the optimal contract to implement low effort in Scenario I (i.e., the
contract Γ0 as identified in Lemma 2) specifies the ex post efficient levels of project
size (yL = 1 and yH = 0) and transfer payments that exactly compensate the agent
for his cost of project implementation (tL = cL and tH = 0). As the two interim
participation constraints (PCIIL ) and (PC
II
H ) are satisfied under contract Γ0, this
contract must also be optimal to implement low effort in Scenario II.
Lemma 4 Consider Scenario II and suppose that b < cH . If the principal wants to
implement low effort (e = 0), then the contract Γ0 that specifies transfer payments
tL = cL and tH = 0 and levels of project size yL = 1 and yH = 0 is an optimal
contract.
Next, suppose that the principal wants to implement high effort e = 1. To




UP (Γ, 1) subject to (IC1), (PC
II
H ),
where, according to (1), the incentive compatibility constraint (IC1) requires (p1−
p0)[(tL − tH) − (cLyL − cHyH)] ≥ k. Under the solution to this relaxed problem
the interim participation constraint in case of high implementation cost (PCIIH )
must be satisfied with equality; i.e., for any given level of project size yH , we
must have tH = cHyH . If this was not the case, the principal could adjust her
contract offer and slightly reduce the transfer tH , which would strictly increase her
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expected utility without violating any constraint (as the incentive compatibility
constraint would be relaxed and the interim participation constraint would still
hold as long as the reduction in tH is sufficiently small). With (PC
II
H ) being
satisfied with equality by construction of the transfer tH , it follows that under
the solution to the relaxed problem the project must be canceled in case of high
implementation cost; i.e., we must have yH = 0. Otherwise yH could be reduced,
which would strictly increase the principal’s expected utility (because b < cH)




, such that the incentive compatibility constraint just binds. With
(IC1) being satisfied with equality by construction of the transfer tL, it follows that
the project size must be maximized in case of low implementation cost; i.e., we
must have yL = 1. Otherwise yL could be increased which would strictly increase
the principal’s expected utility (because cL < b).
Thus, the contract that solves the relaxed problem specifies the ex post efficient
levels of project size, and the transfers are set as low as possible and in a way such
that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with equality. Notably, this
contract also satisfies the constraints (PC1), (LL), and (PC
II
L ). Specifically, with
yH = 0 < ỹ, we know from our discussion of the cost-minimizing transfers in the
case of high effort being implemented in Scenario I that the participation constraint
(PC1) does not impose a binding restriction. With the constraints (LL) and (PC
II
L )
being satisfied trivially because tH = 0 and tL > cL > 0, we have established the
following observation:
Lemma 5 Consider Scenario II and suppose that b < cH . If the principal wants
to implement high effort (e = 1), then the optimal contract ΓII1 specifies transfer
payments tL = cL+
k
p1−p0
and tH = 0 and levels of project size yL = 1 and yH = 0.
Notably, in case the principal implements high preparatory effort, the agent
obtains a strictly positive rent:
UA(Γ
II




Thus, in contrast to Scenario I, the agent’s inalienable right to quit work in Scenario
II prevents the principal from abusing the project size in case of high implemen-
tation cost as an inefficient rent-extraction device.
Step 2. According to Lemma 4, the principal’s maximum expected utility from
implementing low effort is
UP (Γ0, 0) = p0(b− cL). (7)
20
According to Lemma 5, the principal’s maximum expected utility from implement-
ing high effort is
UP (Γ
II




Comparison of (7) and (8) reveals the following levels of project size and effort to
be implemented under the optimal contract.22
Proposition 4 Consider Scenario II and suppose that b < cH . The levels of
project size and effort implemented under the optimal contract are given by
yIIL = 1, y
II





1 if k ≤ kII ,







While in Scenario II the project size is always ex post efficient, moral hazard
in the project preparation stage results in inefficiently low effort provision. Specif-
ically, as kII < kFB, it follows that eII < eFB for kII < k ≤ kFB, and eII = eFB
otherwise.
4.4 Comparison of the scenarios
Recall that in Scenario I, the principal fully extracts the expected gains from
trade, so in contrast to Scenario II the agent never obtains a rent. Moreover,
recall that in Scenario II the principal faces additional constraints (the interim
participation constraints), so the principal cannot be better off than in Scenario I.
As a consequence, it is clear that in the baseline model the agent (weakly) prefers
having an inalienable right to quit (Scenario II), whereas the principal (weakly)
prefers contractual freedom (Scenario I).23 Yet, the comparison between the two
scenarios is much more intricate from the perspective of a lawmaker who wants to
maximize expected welfare.
22Note that when p0 goes to zero, then k
II approaches kFB , since the rent that the agent must
obtain in order to be induced to exert high effort vanishes. Observe that this is not the case
when p1 goes to one.
23However, see Section 6 for an extension of our model in which also the agent may be strictly
better off when he has the freedom to contractually waive his right to quit.
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Note that project size and effort provision in Scenario I differ starkly depending
on whether the benefit of project implementation exceeds the high realization of
implementation cost or not. As established in Proposition 2, if cH ≤ b, then
contracting in Scenario I entails both ex post efficient project size and ex ante
efficient effort. In this case, Scenario II can never yield a strictly larger welfare
(measured by expected gains from trade) than Scenario I. If b < cH , a welfare
comparison is less straightforward. In this case, in Scenario I the first-best outcome
cannot be attained if the first-best allocation involves high preparatory effort (i.e.,
if k ≤ kFB). Specifically, effort is below the first-best level (while project size is
ex post efficient) if kI < k ≤ kFB, whereas project size is inefficiently high (while
effort equals the first-best effort) if k ≤ kI . On the other hand, Scenario II always
results in ex post efficient project size (cf. Proposition 4). Yet, the necessity to leave
a rent to the agent in case that high effort is to be induced leads to inefficiently low
effort provision for intermediate levels of the effort cost (i.e., if kII < k ≤ kFB).
Comparing (6) and (9) reveals that 0 < kII < kI < kFB. Clearly, if kI < k,
expected gains from trade are identical in Scenario I and in Scenario II, because
both scenarios result in low preparatory effort and ex post efficient project size. If
k ≤ kI , on the other hand, expected gains from trade in the two scenarios differ.
Specifically, if kII < k ≤ kI , then in both scenarios the first-best outcome
cannot be achieved, because effort is below the first-best level in Scenario II and
project size is inefficiently high in Scenario I. Nevertheless, expected gains from
trade in this case are unambiguously larger in Scenario I. To see this, recall that the
principal in Scenario I always fully extracts the expected gains from trade. The
fact that in Scenario I the principal strictly prefers to induce high effort rather
than low effort if kII < k ≤ kI (where the expected gains from trade in case of
low effort would correspond to the expected gains from trade in Scenario II), thus
implies that expected gains from trade must be strictly higher in Scenario I than
in Scenario II.
Finally, if k ≤ kII , Scenario II results in ex ante efficient effort and ex post
efficient project size. Yet, the first-best outcome cannot be attained in Scenario
I, where the principal implements an inefficiently large project in case of high
implementation cost in order to fully extract the associated gains from trade by
completely eliminating the agent’s rent. Hence, in this case Scenario II strictly
outperforms Scenario I in terms of expected gains from trade, because it avoids
inefficient rent-seeking by the principal.
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Proposition 5 (i) Suppose cH ≤ b. The expected gains from trade in Scenario
I are at least as large as the expected gains from trade in Scenario II.
(ii) Suppose b < cH . If k ≤ k
II , then the expected gains from trade are strictly
larger in Scenario II than in Scenario I. If kII < k ≤ kI , then the expected
gains from trade are strictly larger in Scenario I than in Scenario II. If
kI < k, then the expected gains from trade in both scenarios are identical.
5 Hidden information
Since c reflects the agent’s disutility from implementing the project (e.g., the phys-
ical and psychological stress from managing the project), one might argue that the
agent is better informed about the realization of c than the principal. To address
the robustness of our findings in this regard, suppose that at date T = 2 the agent
privately learns the realization of the implementation cost parameter c; i.e., we
now consider a situation with not only hidden action but also hidden information.
Hence, in contrast to before, the principal now has to infer the probability distri-
bution over the possible realizations of the implementation cost that results under
the unobservable effort that the agent will exert given the contractual arrangement
under consideration.
According to the revelation principle (cf. Myerson, 1982), the best the principal
can do is to offer a direct revelation mechanism to the agent. That is, at date
T = 3, the agent is asked to make a report ĉ ∈ {cL, cH} regarding his private
observation of the realized level of the implementation cost c.24 The contract
Γ̂ : {cL, cH} → R × [0, 1] offered by the principal at date T = 0 specifies for each
feasible report ĉ of the agent a transfer payment t̂(ĉ) to be paid from the principal
to the agent and a level of project size ŷ(ĉ) to be implemented by the agent at
date T = 4. Denoting ti = t̂(ci) and yi = ŷ(ci) for i ∈ {L,H}, a contract then
effectively again takes the form Γ̂ = (tL, tH , yL, yH).
For the agent to be willing to truthfully report the realization of the implemen-
tation cost c, the following two ex post truth-telling constraints must be satisfied:
VA(tL, yL|cL) ≥ VA(tH , yH |cL) (TTL)
24In case of Scenario II it is irrelevant whether this report is made before or after the agent
decides whether to quit work.
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and
VA(tH , yH |cH) ≥ VA(tL, yL|cH), (TTH)
where, as before, V (t, y|c) = t − cy. Except for these two additional constraints
the principal’s contract design problem in Scenario I, where the agent can waive
his right to quit work, and in Scenario II, where the agent cannot waive his right
to quit work, takes the same form as in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Clearly,
with two additional constraints, in both scenarios it must hold that the principal
can never be better off in the case of hidden information than in the case where
the implementation cost is verifiable.
If a contract specifies tL = tH and yL = yH , then the truth-telling constraints
are satisfied trivially. Therefore, if cH ≤ b, in Scenario I the optimal contract in
case of verifiable implementation cost (cf. Lemma 1) must also be optimal in the
case of hidden information. In consequence, if cH ≤ b, contracting in Scenario
I always results in the first-best outcome even if the agent is privately informed
about the realization of the implementation cost, and thus Scenario I cannot be
welfare-inferior to Scenario II.
Now consider the case b < cH , which is less straightforward. The contract
Γ0, which in case of verifiable implementation cost is optimal if low effort is to be
implemented in both Scenario I and Scenario II (cf. Lemmas 2 and 4), satisfies the
ex post truth-telling constraints (TTL) and (TTH). Specifically, at date T = 3,
the agent is indifferent between telling the truth and lying if c = cL, and he
strictly prefers to tell the truth if c = cH . Yet, the ex post truth-telling constraints





which in case of verifiable implementation cost are optimal if high effort is to be
implemented in Scenario I and Scenario II, respectively (cf. Lemmas 3 and 5).
Importantly, however, the contracts ΓI1 and Γ
II
1 satisfy the ex post truth-telling
constraints whenever the first-best preparatory effort is high (i.e., if k ≤ kFB) and,
thus, whenever they are the overall optimal contract in their respective contracting
scenario. Thus, if b < cH , the contracts which are optimal in Scenario I and
Scenario II, respectively, in case of verifiable implementation cost (cf. Propositions
2 and 4) both satisfy the ex post truth-telling constraints and therefore must be
optimal also in case of hidden information.
Taken together, the above observations imply that the welfare comparison of
the two scenarios does not depend on whether the realization of the implementation
cost is verifiable or privately learned by the agent.
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Proposition 6 If the agent privately learns the realization of the implementation
cost c at date T = 2, then the comparison of Scenario I and Scenario II in terms
of expected gains from trade is as characterized by Proposition 5.
Proof: See the Appendix.
It should be noted that it might be interesting to extend our framework by
adding further sources of informational asymmetries. In particular, in order to
isolate the novel effects on which our analysis is focused, we have assumed that in
the implementation stage there are no unobservable effort decisions to be taken.
If in a addition to a verifiable production decision there were also hidden actions
in the implementation stage, then limited liability rents might have to be paid in
order to induce high second-stage effort, which in turn could have an impact on the
first-stage effort incentives.25 It may be a promising avenue for future research to
explore the impact of restrictions on the freedom to contract when such incentive
spillovers come into play.
6 An extended model with ex ante investment
So far, we have assumed that the principal’s production technology used by the
agent is already in place. We now extend our model by adding a prior stage in
which the principal decides whether or not to make non-contractible investments
in order to develop the production technology. Moreover, following many papers
in the principal-agent literature, we have assumed so far that the principal has all
the bargaining power. We now generalize the contract negotiations by allowing
also the agent to have some bargaining power.
Recall that in the baseline model, the agent was always (weakly) better off
in Scenario II, i.e. when having an inalienable right to quit. In contrast, we will
show that in our extended model there are circumstances under which the agent is
strictly better off in Scenario I, i.e. when the freedom of contract is not restricted.
Specifically, suppose now that at date T = −1, the principal has to decide
whether or not to invest the fixed amount I > 0 in installing the production
25Specifically, starting with Schmitz (2005a) several papers have studied the effect that under
some circumstances an agent may have an incentive not to be successful in the first stage in
order to get a larger rent in the second stage (see e.g. the recent contributions by Kräkel, 2016,
Pi, 2018, and Hoppe and Schmitz, 2021). Overcoming such dysfunctional incentives can make
implementing high effort in the first stage particularly costly for the principal.
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technology that the subsequent principal-agent relationship is based on in the first
place. The non-contractible investment decision is denoted by x ∈ {0, 1}. Here,
x = 0 corresponds to the principal not investing the amount I and thus not
installing the production technology, whereas x = 1 corresponds to the principal
investing the amount I and installing the production technology. In the former
case, with no production technology being built, nothing else happens and both
the principal and the agent each receive a reservation utility equal to zero. In the
latter case, at date T = 0 the parties negotiate a contract. In order to allow the
agent to have some bargaining power, we model the negotiations in the following
way. With probability ε ∈ (0, 1), the agent can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the principal, while otherwise the principal can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the agent.26 Thereafter, the sequence of events is as in our baseline model outlined
in Section 3. For the sake of exposition, we restrict our attention to the case where
b < cH holds.
Suppose that at date T = −1 the principal has invested in installing the pro-
duction technology. If at date T = 0 the draw of nature determines that the
principal can make the contract offer, then the equilibrium of the subgame start-
ing at date T = 0 corresponds to the equilibrium outcome of our baseline model.
As a consequence, in Scenario I, by (4) and (5) together with Proposition 3, the
expected utilities of the principal and the agent under the optimal contract from












+ cL − ỹcH
]
if k ≤ kI ,







I) = 0, (11)
respectively. Likewise, in Scenario II, by (7) and (8) together with Proposition 4,
the expected utilities of the principal and the agent under the optimal contract











if k ≤ kII ,
p0(b− cL) if k
II < k
(12)
26This simple bargaining game has often been used in the literature on hold-up problems, where
parties can make non-contractible investments before negotiations take place; see e.g. Hart and












if k ≤ kII ,
0 if kII < k,
(13)
respectively.
What is the equilibrium of the subgame starting at date T = 0 if the draw of
nature determines that the agent can make the contract offer? In Scenario I, the





UA(Γ, e) ≥ UA(Γ, e
′) with e, e′ ∈ {0, 1}, e 6= e′, (ICe)
UP (Γ, e) ≥ 0. (P̂Ce)
Here, the incentive compatibility constraint (ICe) reflects that the agent correctly
anticipates his own behavior at date T = 1. The participation constraint (P̂Ce)
ensures that at date T = 0, the principal (who correctly anticipates the agent’s
date-1 effort choice) is willing to accept the contract offered by the agent.27 With
UA(Γ, e) = G(yL, yH , e) − UP (Γ, e), the best that the agent can hope for in ei-
ther scenario is to contractually specify the first-best project size for each level
of implementation cost and to impose associated transfer payments that not only
induce the agent to exert the first-best effort level (i.e., such that (ICeFB) is satis-
fied), but also fully extract the expected gains from trade (i.e., such that (P̂CeFB)
is satisfied with equality). As is readily verified, this in fact can be achieved by
transfer payments that equal the principal’s respective gross benefit from imple-
menting a project of the first-best project size. Notably, this contract specification
also satisfies the two interim participation constraints that have to be taken into
consideration in Scenario II, which require that V (ti, yi|ci) = ti − ciyi ≥ 0 for
all i ∈ {L,H}. Thus, we come to the following conclusion regarding the agent’s
optimal contract offer at date T = 0.
Lemma 6 Consider Scenario S ∈ {I, II} and suppose that b < cH . If the agent
can make the contract offer at date T = 0, then the optimal contract Γ̂ speci-
fies transfer payments t̂L = b and t̂H = 0. The levels of project size and effort
27A limited liability constraint is absent in the agent’s contract design problem, because we
did not assume that the principal is protected by limited liability.
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implemented under the optimal contract are given by




1 if k ≤ kFB,
0 if kFB < k.
Notably, the agent’s optimal contract offer does not depend on whether the
freedom of contract is restricted or not. In consequence, from the date-0 perspec-
tive, the principal’s and the agent’s expected utilities under the agent’s optimal
contract offer are given by
UP (Γ̂, ê) = 0 and UA(Γ̂, ê) = G(1, 0, e
FB), (14)
respectively.
From the perspective of date T = −1, the expected utilities of the principal
and the agent in case that the principal makes the investment decision x ∈ {0, 1}
in Scenario S ∈ {I, II} amount to





ÛA(x|S) = x[(1− ε)UA(Γ
S
eS , e
S) + εG(1, 0, eFB)],
respectively. Assuming, as a tie-breaking rule, that the principal will make the
investment at date T = −1 if and only if her expected utility from investing
strictly exceeds her expected utility from not investing, the equilibrium investment





1 if I < ÎS,
0 if ÎS ≤ I,




For k ≥ kI , from (10) and (12) it follows that ÎI = ÎII ; i.e., the principal’s
investment decision is independent of the scenario that the transaction takes place
in. As a consequence, for k ≥ kI , also the expected utilities (from the perspective
of date T = −1) of both the principal and the agent are independent of whether
we are in Scenario I or in Scenario II.
For k < kI , on the other hand, (10) and (12) imply ÎII < ÎI , such that the
range of the investment cost parameter I in which the principal invests is strictly
larger in Scenario I than in Scenario II. If the investment cost is so low that the
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principal invests in either scenario (i.e., I < ÎII), then as in our baseline model
the principal is strictly better off in Scenario I (where she can fully extract the
agent’s rent in case that she can make the contract offer), whereas the agent is
weakly better off in Scenario II (where he obtains a strictly positive rent in case
that the principal can make the contract offer and high effort is implemented). If,
however, the investment cost parameter takes on an intermediate value such that
the principal is willing to invest only in Scenario I but not in Scenario II (i.e.,
ÎII ≤ I < ÎI), then in contrast to our baseline model both parties are strictly
better off in Scenario I. The reason for the agent now being strictly better off in
Scenario I is that he is guaranteed a strictly positive expected rent in Scenario I
(since he can make the contract offer with strictly positive probability), while he
receives only his reservation utility of zero in Scenario II. Finally, if the investment
cost is so large that the principal is not willing to invest in either scenario (i.e.,
ÎI ≤ I), then the expected utilities (from the perspective of date T = −1) of both
the principal and the agent equal zero under either scenario.
The following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 7 Suppose that b < cH . From the perspective of date T = −1,
(i) if k < kI and I < ÎII , then the principal’s expected utility is strictly higher
and the agent’s expected utility is weakly lower in Scenario I than in Scenario
II, i.e., ÛP (x
I |I) > ÛP (x
II |II) and ÛA(x
I |I) ≤ ÛA(x
II |II);
(ii) if k < kI and ÎII ≤ I < ÎI , then the principal’s expected utility and the
agent’s expected utility are strictly higher in Scenario I than in Scenario II,
i.e., ÛP (x
I |I) > ÛP (x
II |II) and ÛA(x
I |I) > ÛA(x
II |II);
(iii) the principal’s expected utility and the agent’s expected utility are identical
in Scenario I and in Scenario II otherwise, i.e., ÛP (x
I |I) = ÛP (x
II |II) and
ÛA(x
I |I) = ÛA(x
II |II).
7 Concluding remarks
Given the gains from trade that can be realized by Coasean bargaining, a funda-
mental question in economic policy is when lawmakers should restrict individuals’
freedom to enter into voluntary contracts.
29
Indeed, today there are many restrictions on the freedom of contract.28 In the
present paper, we have focused on the fact that workers are not permitted to en-
ter into labor contracts in which they waive their right to quit work.29 Similarly,
Basu (2003, p. 141) has somewhat provocatively pointed out that “under current
U.S. law, a firm cannot offer a job contract in which the pay is high and the bene-
fits good–but the employer reserves the right to sexually harass the worker”, even
though a worker who accepts such a job must find the cost of sexual harassment
to be less than the benefits associated with the job. Usury laws restrict the rate
of interest to which parties may agree. Following the so-called penalty doctrine,
courts do not enforce stipulated damage clauses when the contractually specified
payments seem to be punitive. It is forbidden to sell one’s organs. Labor mar-
ket regulations limit the hours of work and stop workers from being exposed to
excessive health hazards.
In these and similar instances, ethical considerations and agents’ bounded ra-
tionality may well be important reasons not to enforce every contract, even if
the contract is entered voluntarily.30 Our contribution is complementary to argu-
ments along these lines, as we focus on a pure economic efficiency perspective in
a contract-theoretic setting with fully rational agents. Our model illustrates that
already in such a setup it can be beneficial to restrict the freedom of contract, even
if there are no negative externalities on third parties and even if the contract is
written under symmetric information. In particular, giving agents an inalienable
right to quit work can be desirable in employment relationships plagued by moral
hazard, because it can restrain principals from offering labor contracts that are
motivated by inefficient rent-seeking behavior.
28Note that from “a constitutional standpoint, the notion of contractual liberty has a spotted
history” (Talley, 1994, p. 1195). Starting with Lochner v. New York (198 U.S. 45, 64 [1905]), the
United States Supreme Court struck down several state regulations that constrained the freedom
of contract (such as state legislation limiting weekly working hours). Yet, the Court reversed its
view in the case West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (300 U.S. 379 [1937]), in which it upheld a
state law setting a minimum wage. For discussions of the so-called “Lochner era,” see Sunstein
(1987) and Bernstein (2003).
29This topic has recently seen a renewed interest in the context of illegal immigration of
“undocumented workers” (see e.g. Kim, 2015, and Ontiveros, 2019).
30See Köszegi’s (2014) recent survey on behavioral contract theory for a discussion of exploita-
tive contracts, in which a principal tries to profit from an agent’s bounded rationality. See also
the recent work by Buechel et al. (2020) for an analysis of law enforcement when subjects may
be naïve.
30
However, as highlighted in our extended model, while restricting the freedom of
contract may appear to be a well-intentioned policy in a world in which production
technologies are already in place, in the long run such a policy might actually hurt
not only the principal but also the agent. In particular, when the principal first has
to make non-contractible investments to come up with new technologies and thus




Proof of Lemma 3.
It remains to formally derive the cost-minimizing transfers for given levels of
project size (yL, yH) ∈ [0, 1]
2. The problem of finding the cost-minimizing transfers









IC(tH) := tH +
k
p1 − p0














tL ≥ 0, tH ≥ 0. (LL)
In the (tH , tL)—space, Φ
PC(·) is a straight line with negative slope and a strictly
positive vertical intercept (i.e., ΦPC(0) > 0), and ΦIC(·) is a straight line with
strictly positive slope. Furthermore, the isocost line
{
(tL, tH) ∈ R
2 | p1tL + (1− p1)tH = τ
}
contains all transfer combinations (tL, tH) that, given the agent exerts high effort,
result in the same expected transfer payment τ . Hence, in the (tH , tL)—space, the
family of isocost lines consists of parallel straight lines with the same negative slope
as ΦPC(·). An isocost line with a smaller vertical intercept contains combinations
of transfer payments that result in a strictly lower expected transfer payment than
combinations of transfer payments contained by an isocost line with a greater
vertical intercept. The solution to the above cost-minimization problem thus is a
transfer combination (t̄L, t̄H) that satisfies (IC1), (PC1), and (LL) such that there
is no other transfer combination (t̃L, t̃H) that satisfies (IC1), (PC1), and (LL) and
lies on a lower isocost line than (t̄L, t̄H).














Figure 1. Cost-minimizing transfers payments implementing e = 1 in
the case yH < ỹ (left panel) and in the case yH > ỹ (right panel). The
green lines depict the incentive compatibility constraints, the red lines depict
the participation constraints, and the blue lines depict the limited liability
constraints.
Hence, if yH < ỹ, as depicted in the left panel of Figure 1, the participation
constraint (PC1) does not impose a binding restriction. The lowest feasible isocost
line is reached by setting transfer tH equal to zero and transfer tL such that (given
tH = 0) the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with equality. If, in
contrast, yH ≥ ỹ, as depicted in the right panel of Figure 1, the participation
constraint (PC1) must be binding under the cost-minimizing transfer combination.
Specifically, any feasible transfer combination that satisfies (PC1) with equality
and additionally satisfies (IC1) and (LL) is a cost-minimizing transfer combination.
In consequence, the transfer combination with transfer tH being set equal to zero
and transfer tL being set such that (given tH = 0) the participation constraint
is satisfied with equality is always a cost-minimizing transfer combination. The
cost-minimizing transfer combination for levels (yL, yH) ∈ [0, 1]
2 of project size
then (w.l.o.g.) can be summarized as follows:












cHyH if yH ≥ ỹ.

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Proof of Proposition 3.
First, consider the case k ≥ cH(p1−p0)
p0
such that min{1, ỹ} = 1. Here, UP (Γ0, 0) >




[(p1 − p0)(b− cL) + (1− p1)b+ p1cH ]. (15)





[(p1 − p0)(b− cL) + (1− p1)b+ p1cH ] <
cH(p1 − p0)
p0
⇐⇒ p1(1− p0)cH > p0(1− p0)b− p0(p1 − p0)cL
holds by 0 < p0 < p1 and 0 < cL < b < cH , condition (15) is satisfied and the
principal implements low effort (i.e., e = 0).
Next, consider the case k < cH(p1−p0)
p0
such thatmin{1, ỹ} = ỹ. Here, U lP (Γ0, 0) >











⇐⇒ p1(1− p0)cH > p0(1− p0)b− p0(p1 − p0)cL,




, such that the
principal implements high effort (i.e., e = 1) if k ≤ kI and low effort (i.e., e = 0)
if kI < k < cH(p1−p0)
p0
. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
It remains to show that the contracts ΓI1 (identified in Lemma 3) and Γ
II
1 (identified
in Lemma 5) satisfy the ex post truth-telling constraints (TTL) and (TTH) in case
that they are the optimal contract in Scenario I and Scenario II, respectively. To
this end, in what follows, suppose that eFB = 1 or, equivalently, k
(p1−p0)(b−cL)
< 1.
First, consider the contract ΓI1. As e
FB = 1 implies that ỹ = kp0
cH(p1−p0)
< 1, the
contract ΓI1 specifies tL = cL + k
1−p0
p1−p0
, tH = 0, yL = 1, and yH = ỹ. If c = cL, the










clearly is satisfied. If c = cH , the agent weakly prefers to tell the truth whenever




equivalently, k ≤ (p1 − p0)(cH − cL), which holds given that e
FB = 1.
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Next, consider the contract ΓII1 , which specifies tL = cL +
k
p1−p0
, tH = 0,
yL = 1, and yH = 0. If c = cL, the agent weakly prefers to tell the truth whenever
VA(tL, yL|cL) = [cL +
k
p1−p0
] − cL is at least as large as VA(tH , yH |cL) = 0, which
clearly is satisfied. If c = cH , the agent weakly prefers to tell the truth whenever




equivalently, k ≤ (p1 − p0)(cH − cL), which holds given that e
FB = 1.
The result then follows from ΓI1 being the optimal contract in Scenario I if and
only if k ≤ kI , ΓII1 being the optimal contract in Scenario II if and only if k ≤ k
II ,
and the fact that kII < kI < kFB. 
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Appendix B: Robustness
In our paper, the outcome of the first stage determines the costs that the agent
has to incur when the project is implemented in the second stage. Our findings
are robust with regard to the connection of the two stages. It turns out that
qualitatively similar results hold when the costs are independent of the first-stage
outcome, but instead the benefit of project implementation is determined by the
outcome of the first stage.
Specifically, assume now that the marginal cost of project implementation
equals a fixed amount c. Furthermore, if the agent has exerted preparatory ef-
fort e ∈ {0, 1} at date T = 1, then the realization of the marginal benefit at date
T = 2 is bH with probability pe and bL with probability 1− pe. We restrict atten-
tion to the case 0 ≤ bL < c < bH . Apart from that, the model is as described in
Section 3 of the paper.
In what follows, yL and tL refer to the project size that is to be implemented
and the transfer that is to be paid from the principal to the agent in case that
the marginal benefit of project implementation equals bL. Likewise, yH and tH
refer to the project size that is to be implemented and the transfer that is to be
paid from the principal to the agent in case that the marginal benefit of project
implementation equals bH .
The first-best benchmark
The expected gains from trade are
Ĝ(yL, yH , e) = pe(bH − c)yH + (1− pe)(bL − c)yL − ke. (16)






Ĝ(yL, yH , e). (17)
With bL < c < bH , we have ŷ
FB(bL) = 0 and ŷ
FB(bH) = 1. Hence, with ê
FB =
argmaxe∈{0,1} Ĝ(0, 1, e), we have ê
FB = 1 if and only if k ≤ k̂FB, where
k̂FB := (p1 − p0)(bH − c). (18)
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Scenario I: Unrestricted freedom of contract
Suppose that at date T = 0 the principal and the agent sign a contract Γ =
(tL, tH , yL, yH) under which the agent exerts effort e ∈ {0, 1}. The principal’s
expected utility in this case comprises the expected benefit from project imple-
mentation minus the expected transfer payment to the agent:
ÛP (Γ, e) = [pebHyH + (1− pe)bLyL]− [petH + (1− pe)tL] (19)
The agent’s expected utility comprises the expected transfer payment from the
principal minus the expected cost of project implementation minus the cost for
preparatory effort:
ÛA(Γ, e) = petH + (1− pe)tL − c[peyH + (1− pe)yL]− ke. (20)





ÛA(Γ, e) ≥ ÛA(Γ, e
′) with e, e′ ∈ {0, 1}, e 6= e′, (ICe)
ÛA(Γ, e) ≥ 0, (PCe)
tL ≥ 0, tH ≥ 0. (LL)
Implementation of low effort.–Suppose that the principal wants to induce low
effort e = 0 and consider a contract Γ′ that specifies ex post efficient levels of
project size, y′L = 0 and y
′
H = 1, and transfer payments that exactly reimburse the
agent for his respective cost of project implementation, t′L = 0 and t
′
H = c. Clearly,
Γ′ satisfies the (LL) constraint. Furthermore, ÛA(Γ
′, 0) = 0 and ÛA(Γ
′, 1) = −k,
such that Γ′ satisfies the both the (PC0) constraint and the (IC0) constraint.
Specifically, with the (PC0) constraint being satisfied with equality, offering the
contract Γ′ allows the principal to fully extract the expected gains from trade, such
that the principal’s expected utility coincides with the expected gains from trade
under low preparatory effort and implementation of the ex post efficient project
size. As this is the best the principal can do given that she implements low effort,
we have established the following observation:
Lemma 7 Consider Scenario I and suppose that bL < c < bH . If the principal
wants to implement low effort (e = 0), then the contract Γ̂0 that specifies transfer
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payments tL = 0 and tH = c and levels of project size yL = 0 and yH = 1 is an
optimal contract.
Implementation of high effort.–Suppose that the principal wants to induce
high effort e = 1. To determine the optimal contract in this case, we proceed as
follows. First, we determine the “cost-minimizing” transfers for exogenously fixed
levels of project size. Thereafter, we determine the optimal level of project size
given that transfers are chosen in a cost-minimizing fashion.
For given levels of project size (yL, yH) ∈ [0, 1]
2, the problem of finding the









IC(tL) := tL +
k
p1 − p0


















tL ≥ 0, tH ≥ 0. (LL)





we will have to distinguish the two cases depicted in Figure 2: yL < ŷ and yL ≥ ŷ.
The isocost line
{
(tL, tH) ∈ R
2 | p1tH + (1− p1)tL = τ
}
contains all transfer combinations (tL, tH) that, given the agent exerts high effort,
result in the same expected transfer payment τ . Hence, in the (tL, tH)—space, the
family of isocost lines consists of parallel straight lines with the same negative slope
as Φ̂PC(·). An isocost line with a smaller vertical intercept contains combinations
of transfer payments that result in a strictly lower expected transfer payment than
combinations of transfer payments contained by an isocost line with a greater
vertical intercept. The solution to the above cost-minimization problem thus is a
transfer combination (t̄L, t̄H) that satisfies (IC1), (PC1), and (LL) such that there
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is no other transfer combination (t̃L, t̃H) that satisfies (IC1), (PC1), and (LL) and








Figure 2. Cost-minimizing transfers payments implementing e = 1 in
the case yL < ŷ (left panel) and in the case yL > ŷ (right panel). The
green lines depict the incentive compatibility constraints, the red lines depict
the participation constraints, and the blue lines depict the limited liability
constraints.
Hence, if yL < ŷ, as depicted in the left panel of Figure 2, the participation
constraint (PC1) does not impose a binding restriction. The lowest feasible isocost
line is reached by setting transfer tL equal to zero and transfer tH such that (given
tL = 0) the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with equality. If, in
contrast, yL ≥ ŷ, as depicted in the right panel of Figure 2, the participation
constraint (PC1) must be binding under the cost-minimizing transfer combination.
Specifically, any feasible transfer combination that satisfies (PC1) with equality
and additionally satisfies (IC1) and (LL) is a cost-minimizing transfer combination.
In consequence, the transfer combination with transfer tL being set equal to zero
and transfer tH being set such that (given tL = 0) the participation constraint
is satisfied with equality is always a cost-minimizing transfer combination. The
cost-minimizing transfer combination for levels (yL, yH) ∈ [0, 1]
2 of project size
then (w.l.o.g.) can be summarized as follows:
















if yL ≥ ŷ.
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Given the cost-minimizing specification of the transfer payments, the optimal













+ c(yH − yL)
]
if yL ≤ ŷ,











if yL ≥ ŷ.






> 0 if yL < ŷ,





the optimal levels of project size are given by yL = min{1, ŷ} and yH = 1, which
yields the following observation.
Lemma 8 Consider Scenario I and suppose that bL < c < bH . If the principal
wants to implement high effort (e = 1), then the contract Γ̂I1 that specifies transfer
payments tL = 0 and tH =
k
p1−p0
+ c(1 − min{1, ŷ}) and levels of project size
yL = min{1, ŷ} and yH = 1 is an optimal contract.
Optimal contract.–According to Lemma 7, the principal’s maximum expected
utility from implementing low effort is
ÛP (Γ̂0, 0) = p0(bH − c). (21)
According to Lemma 8, the principal’s maximum expected utility from implement-
ing high effort is
ÛP (Γ̂
I




+ c(1−min {1, ŷ})
]
. (22)




{(p1 − p0)(bH − c) + [(1− p1)bL + p1c] min{1, ŷ}} . (23)
First, suppose that ŷ ≥ 1 or, equivalently, k ≥ c(p1−p0)
p0
















If the quadratic function f(·) has no real-valued zeros, then f(p0) > 0 holds
trivially. If the quadratic function f(·) has one (two) real-valued zero (zeros), this
zero (the smaller of these zeros) is given by
p−0 =
p1bH + (1− p1)bL −
√
[p1bH + (1− p1)bL]2 − 4(bH − c)p1c
2(bH − c)
. (25)
As can readily be verified, bL < c implies that p
−
0 > p1, such that we must have
f(p0) > 0 for all p0 ∈ (0, p1). Hence, if k ≥
c(p1−p0)
p0
, then the principal will
implement low effort e = 0.
Next, suppose that ŷ < 1 or, equivalently, k < c(p1−p0)
p0
. In this case, k R
p1−p0
p1




cp1(1− p0)− bL(1− p1)p0
. (26)




. Hence, if k ≤ k̂I , the
principal will implement high effort e = 1. Otherwise, the principal will implement
low effort e = 0.
Thus, we come to the following observation regarding the levels of project size
and effort to be induced under the optimal contract.
Proposition 8 Consider Scenario I and suppose that bL < c < bH . The levels of
project size and effort implemented under the optimal contract are given by






ŷ if k ≤ k̂I ,





1 if k ≤ k̂I ,
0 if k̂I < k.
Scenario II: The inalienable right to quit
For the agent to be willing to continue the contractual relationship at date T = 3,
the following two interim participation constraints have to be satisfied:




V̂ (tH , yH) ≥ 0, (PC
II
H )










Compared to Scenario I, the principal faces two additional constraints, the interim
participation constraints (PCIIL ) and (PC
II
H ). In consequence, the best that the
principal can hope for in Scenario II is to be as well off as in Scenario I.
Implementation of low effort.–Suppose that the principal wants to induce low
effort e = 0. Recall that the optimal contract to implement low effort in Scenario
I (i.e., the contract Γ̂0 as identified in Lemma 7) specifies the ex post efficient
levels of project size (yL = 0 and yH = 1) and transfer payments that exactly
compensate the agent for his cost of project implementation (tL = 0 and tH = c).
As the two interim participation constraints (PCIIL ) and (PC
II
H ) are satisfied under
contract Γ̂0, this contract must also be optimal to implement low effort in Scenario
II.
Lemma 9 Consider Scenario II and suppose that bL < c < bH . If the principal
wants to implement low effort (e = 0), then the contract Γ̂0 that specifies transfer
payments tL = 0 and tH = c and levels of project size yL = 0 and yH = 1 is an
optimal contract.
Implementation of high effort.–Suppose that the principal wants to implement
high effort e = 1. To derive the optimal contract in Scenario II for this case,
consider the following relaxed problem:
max
Γ∈R2×[0,1]2
ÛP (Γ, 1) subject to (IC1), (PC
II
L ),
where the (IC1) constraint requires (p1 − p0)[(tH − tL) − c(yH − yL)] ≥ k. Under
the solution to this relaxed problem the (PCIIL ) constraint must be satisfied with
equality; i.e., for any given level of project size yL, we must have tL = cyL. If
this was not the case, the principal could adjust her contract offer and slightly
reduce the transfer tL which would strictly increase her expected utility without
violating any constraint. With (PCIIL ) being satisfied with equality by construction
of the transfer tL, it follows that under the solution to the relaxed problem the
project must be canceled in case of low marginal benefit; i.e., we must have yL =
0. Otherwise yL could be reduced which would strictly increase the principal’s
expected utility (because bL < c) without violating (IC1). The transfer tH then
must be set as low as possible; i.e., tH = cyH+
k
p1−p0
, such that the (IC1) just binds.
With (IC1) being satisfied with equality, it follows that the project size must be
maximized in case of high marginal benefit; i.e., we must have yH = 1. Otherwise
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yH could be increased which would strictly increase the principal’s expected utility
(because c < bH).
Notably, the contract that solves the relaxed problem also satisfies the con-
straints (PC1), (LL) and (PC
II
L ). In consequence, the contract that is optimal in
the relaxed problem is optimal also in the principal’s original problem.
Lemma 10 Consider Scenario II and suppose that bL < c < bH . If the principal
wants to implement high effort (e = 1), then the optimal contract Γ̂II1 specifies
transfer payments tL = 0 and tH = c+
k
p1−p0
and levels of project size yL = 0 and
yH = 1.
Optimal contract.–According to Lemma 9, the principal’s maximum expected
utility from implementing low effort is
ÛP (Γ0, 0) = p0(bH − cL). (27)
According to Lemma 10, the principal’s maximum expected utility from imple-
menting high effort is
ÛP (Γ̂
II




Comparison of (27) and (28) reveals that the principal will implement high effort





(bH − c). (29)
Otherwise, the principal will implement low effort e = 0.
Thus, we come to the following observation regarding the levels of project size
and effort to be implemented under the optimal contract.
Proposition 9 Consider Scenario II and suppose that bL < c < bH . The levels of
project size and effort implemented under the optimal contract are given by
ŷIIL = 1, ŷ
II





1 if k ≤ k̂II ,
0 if k̂II < k.
Comparison of the scenarios
Comparing (18), (26), and (29) reveals that 0 < k̂II < k̂I < k̂FB. First, if k̂I < k,
expected gains from trade are identical in Scenario I and in Scenario II, because
both scenarios result in low preparatory effort and ex post efficient project size.
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Next, if k̂II < k ≤ k̂I , expected gains from trade are unambiguously higher in
Scenario I. To see this, recall that the principal in Scenario I always fully extracts
the expected gains from trade. The fact that in Scenario I the principal strictly
prefers to induce high effort rather than low effort if k̂II < k ≤ k̂I (where the
expected gains from trade in case of low effort would correspond to the expected
gains from trade in Scenario II), thus implies that expected gains from trade must
be strictly higher in Scenario I than in Scenario II.
Finally, if k ≤ k̂II , Scenario II results in ex ante efficient effort and ex post
efficient project size. Yet, the first-best outcome is failed in Scenario I, where
the principal implements an inefficiently large project in case of a low marginal
benefit of implementation in order to fully extract the associated gains from trade
by completely eliminating the agent’s rent. Hence, in this case Scenario II strictly
outperforms Scenario I in terms of expected gains from trade.
Proposition 10 Suppose bL < c < bH . If k ≤ k̂
II , then the expected gains from
trade are strictly larger in Scenario II than in Scenario I. If k̂II < k ≤ k̂I , then
the expected gains from trade are strictly larger in Scenario I than in Scenario II.
If k̂I < k, then the expected gains from trade in both scenarios are identical.
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